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CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 2
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Moius G. SHANKER AND MARK P. ABEL*
Consumer protection from defective goods or unfair contracts
has become a subject of increased attention with the establishment
of legal assistance for indigent claimants who have been the victims
of unscrupulous merchants. Lawyers are searching the Uniform
Commercial Code for legal remedies for consumer wrongs. This
article attempts to dissect the portion of the Uniform Commercial
Code dealing with sales transactions, article 2, and chart some of
the established and potential remedies available to the customer.
There are two classes of cases in which consumer protection is most
often needed. One involves transactions in which the buyer does
not receive the quality of merchandise for which he had bar-
gained. This class gives rise to claims dealing with warranties that
may have attached during the sale. The second involves transactions
in which the buyer receives merchandise in conformity to his ex-
pectations but other aspects of the agreement seem unfair. The
latter class may give rise to arguments based on unconscionability
or lack of good faith.
I. CREATION OF WARRANTIES
Where the goods are defective, the buyer's legal remedy wil
most often be an action for breach of warranty. Under the Code,
there are two types of warranties relating to the quality of the goods:
expressI and implied.2 Each of these warranties contains subparts to
give protection for different aspects of the sales transaction. The
express warranty results from some affirmative act by the seller in
attempting to promote his product. This action by the seller may
take the form of a promise or an affirmation with respect to the
* This article was prepared by members of the Editorial Board under the direc-
tion of Mr. Abel. It is an expansion and elaboration of an address given by Professor
Shanker, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, at a seminar on law and
poverty in Columbus, Ohio in 1967, first published in Oiuo ST. LEGAL SERVIcES Assc.,
THE CouasE ON LAW AND PovERTy: Tan CoNsuMER (1967). Professor Shanker's co-opera-
tion in permitting the free use of his manuscript is gratefully acknowledged. However,
the Editorial Board assumes full responsibility for the style and substance of this article.
ED.
I UNIFORM CO ERC I AL CODE § 2-313 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
2 Id. §§ 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability), 2-315 (implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose).
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quality of his products. Most often this warranty will be created by
an oral or written guarantee, but the word "guarantee" need not be
present; in fact, many oral statements by the seller will be adequate
to create this type of express warranty.3 A less obvious express war-
,ranty is that the kind of goods sold will actually be delivered to the
buyer. For example, if a seller promises to sell a heavy duty motor,
he warrants both that a motor will be delivered to the buyer and
that such motor will be a heavy duty one. It would seem that every
sale agreement contains an express warranty, at least to the extent
the description of the product carries a promise that the goods will
be delivered and will conform to that description.4 Express war-
ranties are not limited to verbal promises of the seller but include use
of a model or sample by a seller to indicate his goods to the buyer.'
Not all acts of the seller give rise to express warranties. There
must also be shown some degree of reliance on the part of the buyer
to transform an act of the seller into a warranty upon which an
action for damages may be based. To create an express warranty
under the Code the promise, affirmation, description, or sample
must be part of the "basis of the bargain."' The basis of the bar-
gain test is a change from the warranty test of the Uniform Sales
Act which required that the affirmation or promise be "relied upon"
by the buyer before a warranty would arise.7 The Code, however,
recognizes the reliance doctrine as being peculiar to estoppel, based
on a subjective theory of contract and difficult of proof. It therefor
creates a presumption that reliance has occurred by putting the
seller to his proof that his statements could not have become the
basis of the bargain. A broader and more objective standard is the
result.
The second type of warranty which the Code recognizes is the
3 Id. § 2-313(2). Puffing, as defined by this section, is excluded from the express
warranty, since it cannot fairly be viewed as entering into the bargain. The presump.
tion is created that any statements made by the seller become part of the basis of
the bargain, and good reason to the contrary must be shown to exclude such statements
from the express warranty. See § 2-313, Comment 3. See also Green Chevrolet Co. v,
Kemp, 241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142 (1966).
4 See Smith v. Zimbalist, 2 Cal. App. 2d 324, 38 P.2d 170 (1934) for a pre.Code
analysis of conformity to descripton.
5 U.C.C. § 2-313(I)(c).
6 Id. § 2-313.
7 UNIFORM SALEs Acr § 12, [hereinafter cited as SALmS Aar]. Reliance was un-
necessary in warranties of description and sample because both were implied warranties,
SA..s Acr §§ 14, 16.
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implied warranty. One of these is the implied warranty of mer-
chantability.8 This warranty arises whenever a merchant makes a
sale of an item from his regular inventory, including food or drink
wherever consumed. The other implied warranty recognized by the
Code is the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.20 This war-
ranty is implied where the buyer relies on the skill and judgment
of the seller to furnish goods suitable for the buyer's particular pur-
pose and the seller knows of this reliance.
Although the warranty terminology is similar to that used under
the Sales Act," a careful look at the sales warranties found in the
Code will show that they are not precisely the same. The Code has
done three important things to warranty law. First it enlarged war-
ranty protection over that provided by the Sales Act. Thus warran-
ties under the Code will arise more often and be broader in scope
than the comparable warranties under the Sales Act. Abolition of the
inducement-reliance requirement of express warranty will expand
consumer recourse against the unscrupulous merchant. Inclusion of
food and drink in the warranty of merchantability alters the rule in
some jurisdictions. The expansion of products liability through the
warranty of merchantability is encouraged in section 2-314(3). An-
other change is the Code's clarification of the implied warranty of
merchantability, the warranty lawyers rely upon most heavily in per-
sonal injury cases. In the Sales Act merchantability was undefined,
and various interpretations of its content arose.'3 The Code sets forth
six distinct requirements to meet the warranty,14 while leaving room
for judicial expansion. Third, the Code makes warranties cumula-
tive.15 The latter improvement eliminates the need to elect between
warranties and permits claims to be made under any combination
8 U.C.C. § 2-314.
9 Id. § 2-104(1).
10 Id. § 2-315.
11 SAis AcT §§ 12-16.
12 This provision resolves a conflict among jurisdictions begun in the classic cases
of Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918) and Valeri v.
Pullman Co., 218 F. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). Ohio has long allowed recvery for injury by
defective food or drink. See Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N.E.2d 731
(1938); Tipple v. High Street Hotel Co., 70 Ohio App. 397, 41 N.E2d 897 (1941).
13 See Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MrrNN. L. REV.
117, 125-139 (1943).
14 U.C.C. § 2-314(2).
15 Id. § 2-317.
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of the warranties, unless a particular combination would be un-
reasonable or inconsistent. Rules are provided for ascertaining the
intention of the parties in the event cumulation is not possible.10
II. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
There may be a practical limit on a remedy based on warranty
due to the parol evidence rule, which traditionally insured that
when a contract had been reduced to writing the written terms
would not be later contradicted by extrinsic or parol evidence. The
parol evidence rule was firmly entrenched in our common law
and is retained under the Code: "Terms .. .which are . . . set
forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agreement ... may not be contradicted by evidence of any
prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement .... 17
The force of the rule was demonstrated in a recent Arkansas
case, Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp.'8 In this case an automobile
salesman had assured the buyer during oral negotiations that pre-
ceded the sale that the car was absolutely guaranteed for one year,
and it was shown that such guarantee formed the basis of the bar-
gain. But the written sales agreement said nothing about warran-
ties. In fact, it stated that the consumer had fully examined the car,
tested it and found it to be in first-class condition. The Arkansas
Supreme Court said that evidence of the oral one year guarantee
was not admissible. The written contract stating that the car was
in first-class condition bound the parties and could not be contra-
dicted by oral evidence. Fortunately there are some real limitations
on the impact of the parol evidence rule, but lawyers often over-
look them because they either do not understand the Code provi-
sions, or they fail to analyze the Code or facts with imaginative minds.
A. Written Exclusions of Implied Warranties
Under the Code, a written contractual term purporting to
prevent any warranties from arising during a sale does not neces-
sarily foreclose their existence. For example, section 2-316 requires
that any written disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility must mention the word "merchantability." Furthermore, the
18 Id. These rules prefer specificity over inconsistent general language and express
over implied warranties. Note, also, that the seller is estopped to assert the inconsistency
where he has led the buyer to believe all warranties can be performed. U.C.C. 2-17,
Comment 2.
17 Id. § 2-202.
1S 241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142 (1966).
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disclaiming language must be conspicuous; the Sales Act approach
permitting all warranties to be excluded by small print on the back
of the written contract was abandoned by the Code. The new Code
requirements are illustrated in a case recently decided by the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court. In Hunt v. Perkins Machinery Co., 9 the
disclaimers were on the back of the sales order and there was no
signal on the front of the sales order, where the parties had
signed, indicating further sales conditions were to be found on the
back. The buyer therefore would become aware of the disclaimers
found on the back only after he had already signed the contract on
the front. The court held the disclaimers were ineffective because
they were not conspicuous, and the buyer was allowed to sue on the
implied warranties. The Code follows a similar approach in dealing
with the implied warranty of fitness for purpose. To exclude this
warranty, the exclusion must be in writing and must be conspicu-
ous.20
B. Exclusion of Express Warranties
Although implied warranties can be excluded by a written in-
strument if certain conditions are met, an express warranty found
in the written agreement cannot be excluded. The express warranty
arises because the seller has done something affirmative to push the
sale. By reducing to writing a promise, affirmation, guarantee, or
description, the seller has made an express warranty which he can-
not escape by some language in the sales agreement seeking to negate
or disclaim warranties. For example, if the sales agreement guaran-
tees tires to run for 50,000 miles, two express warranties have arisen.
One is that the goods delivered to the buyer will, in fact, be tires;
the other is that the tires will run for 50,000 miles. Having made
these two express warranties, the seller cannot in a later paragraph
of the sales agreement say that there are no express warranties in-
volved in the sale.2 '
C. Requirement of Finality
Another important restriction on the scope of the Code's parol
evidence rule is that it applies only where the writing is "intended
by the parties as the final expression of their agreement."22 Every
'9 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967).
20 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
21 Id. § 2-316(l).
22 Id. § 2-202.
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writing connected with the sales transaction does not necessarily pre-
sent parol evidence problems. Writings containing disclaimers of war-
ranties, which are delivered to the buyer after the transaction is
closed, can hardly be classified as a writing intended by both parties
as the final expression of their agreement. It is nothing more than
a writing prepared by the seller for his own self-serving purposes and
does not give the seller the right to claim the protection of the parol
evidence rule. In a recent California case the court stated that:
Attempts to escape liability for warranties . . . by dis-
claimers made "upon or after delivery of the goods, by means
of language on an invoice, receipt or similar notice," are in-
effectual "unless the buyer assents or he is charged with knowl-
edge of non warranty as to the transactions."2 3
The writing must be shown to be one which both parties have
agreed shall be their expression of the contract before the parol
evidence rule will be applicable.
D. Consistent Additional Terms
When the parties have agreed to express their sales contract
in a writing, section 2-202 makes it clear that the writing is binding
only as to statements actually contained in the writing. If there are
aspects of the agreement not contained in the writing, these addi-
tional matters may be established by extrinsic evidence. The only
restriction on the introduction of additional terms is that these terms
must be consistent with the writing. For example, the parties may
have signed a sales agreement which contained the price, the delivery
date and the credit terms. However, if the written agreement is silent
as to warranties the writing will be binding only on the matters of
the price, delivery and credit terms, and extrinsic evidence may be
introduced to show warranties which are not covered by the writing
and do not contradict the terms of the writing.
E. Explanation of Language
The parol evidence rule does not prevent a party from using
extrinsic evidence to explain what the language in the writing was
intended to mean. This is true even though the language on its
face may appear to be unambiguous. Under the Code, the plain
meaning of the language found in a sales agreement may not be con-




trolling.2 The Code is more interested in what meaning the parties
actually intended to attach to the particular language.2 5 Evidence of
their intended meaning may be found in their past dealings and by
the usages of the trade. Thus, the Code permits extrinsic evidence to
be introduced to show that the word "dozen" when used by bakers
in a sales contract really means thirteen. Likewise, a thousand sacks
of sugar in the sugar industry may not mean one thousand at all.
Instead, it may mean a thousand sacks plus or minus ten per cent.
Although no cases have been found where this type of evidence was
introduced to clarify a warranty, the legal principle would certainly
apply to warranty language. For example, the words "three months
warranty" in a particular industry, or between a particular seller
and a particular buyer, may really mean four months of free service.
If it can be demonstrated that sellers in that trade, as a matter of
course, normally give service beyond the precise warranty period, the
customer may get the benefit of the extended warranty protection.
F. Future Agreements
Another important limitation on the parol evidence rule is
that the rule only prevents introduction of extrinsic evidence of
understandings that the parties agreed upon prior to or contempo-
raneously with the execution of the writing.2 Thus evidence of a
one year guarantee given after the parties signed a contract con-
taining only a six month warranty would not be excluded by the
rule. In the context of consumer sales transactions one finds that
sellers will often make statements about the quality of their goods
after purchaser has signed a written contract purporting to exclude
warranties. At first it might appear that subsequent statements
would always fail to meet the "basis of the bargain" requirement
for express warranties.2 7 But subsequent agreements become modifi-
cations of the original contract and need no new consideration to
be binding on the parties.2s The only exception to this rule is where
the parties agreed in the written contract that no oral modification of
the original agreement would be permitted.29 Even with such a pro-
vision subsequent oral modification might be effective as a waiver,30
24 U.C.C. § 2-202 and Comment 3.
25 Id.
26 Id. § 2-202.
27 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
28 U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
29 Id. § 2-209(2).
30 Id. § 2-209(5).
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or the buyer may not have separately signed the term barring future
oral modification in the original contract, as required by the Code
to make such a prohibition effective.81
G. Fraud and Mistake
Another method of circumventing the parol evidence restriction
is to demonstrate that the agreement has been tainted with fraud.
Historically, attempts to prove fraud were not barred by the parol
evidence rule because the policy favoring a just result against the
intentional or unintentional advantage that the seller had ac-
quired over the buyer overrode the policy to insure certainty in
written agreements. The common law courts distinguished between
two kinds of fraud-fraud in the execution and fraud in the in-
ducement.3 2
Fraud in the execution arose where the party was justifiably un-
aware of what he had signed-for example, the situation where a
blind person is told to sign a receipt. It later turns out that the
paper is a sales agreement. The common law courts would not en-
force this sales agreement because it had been procured by fraud.
The blind man did not intend to sign a sales agreement, and thus a
basic requirement was not met. The signing had come about because
of the fraud practiced on the blind man.
Fraud in the execution was also available where an illiterate
person signed a contract that he could not understand and therefore
he could easily be misled. This defense was not extended to people
who were not completely blind or completely illiterate. The usual
theory was that people capable of reading ought to read what they
are signing; and if they did not, they cannot argue that they were
misled in the same fashion as a blind or illiterate person might have
been. Justice Taft of the Ohio Supreme Court put it this way:
A person of ordinary mind cannot say that he was misled
into signing a paper which was different from what he intended
to sign when he could have known the truth by merely looking
when he signed. If this were permitted, contracts would not be
worth the paper on which they are written. If a person can read
and is not prevented from reading what he signs, he alone is
responsible for his omission to read what he signs.88 (Citation
omitted.)
81 Id. § 2-209(2) and Comment 3.
32 See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R. 13 (1928).
33 Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 155 Ohio St. 185, 191, 98 N.E.2d 801, 804 (1951),
rev'd on other grounds, 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
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Hence, fraud in the execution was a way of getting around the parol
evidence rule if the rather strict requirements could be shown. If
this kind of fraud was shown, a court would declare the contract void.
Common law courts recognize a second kind of fraud-fraud in
the inducement. Fraud in the inducement arose when a buyer knew
or could easily find out that he was signing a sales agreement. None-
theless, he signed the contract without ordinary investigation because
of a false representation from the seller about the subject matter or
content of the contract. If the buyer could establish this misrepresen-
tation, his contract, though not void as was true in the fraud in the
execution situation, was voidable and could be rescinded at the
buyer's option. The parol evidence rule did not bar evidence of this
kind of fraud.
An interesting example of rescission for fraud is a District of
Columbia case, Saylor v. Handley Motor Co.84 The buyer told an
automobile dealer that he could only afford to pay eighty dollars per
month for the purchase of his car. The seller assured him that the
car he selected could be purchased for that sum. The buyer then
signed a purchase agreement in which the monthly payments were
left blank. Subsequently, the seller filled in these blank spaces, not
for the agreed eighty dollars per month, but for the sum of eighty-
eight dollars per month. The court held that this amounted to fraud
on the buyer and permitted him to rescind the sales contract. The
court pointed out in dictum that the rule was equally applicable to
a sales agreement which was completed when the buyer signed it, but
which contained terms that were contrary to the prior under-
standing of the parties. The court cited with approval the following
language:
The rule is that where one party to an oral agreement en-
trusts the other with the obligation of reducing it to writing, he
has a right to rely upon the representation that it will be drawn
accurately and in accordance with the oral understanding be-
tween them. The presentation of the paper for signature is in
itself a representation that the terms of such oral agreement
have been or will be embodied in the writing.3 5 (Emphasis
added.)
The court stated that fraud can occur even though the party is
negligent in not reading the agreement before signing it where
there is a false representation by the seller as to what is contained in
the writing. Thus, under common law rules, oral warranties, which
34 169 A.2d 683 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1961).
35 Id. at 685.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
were made by the seller and understood to be embodied in the
written contract by the buyer, could provide a basis to rescind the
agreement if they were not in fact so incorporated. However, the
common law rule did not permit every written agreement to be
ignored where there were prior oral agreements to the contrary. The
whole purpose of the parol evidence rule was to prevent that from
happening. To avoid the parol evidence rule, one had to show that
he was induced to sign this writing because of the seller's false repre-
sentation that something was contained in the agreement which
actually was not there. The burden of proving the fraud is often a
heavy one, requiring dear and convincing evidence. Moreover, the
fact that the seller has a writing containing the buyer's signature is
evidence suggesting that no fraud has been practiced.
Under the Code these common law distinctions and remedies
remain. The actual words of the Code state that the parol evidence
rules applies only to writings which are "intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement.... ."0 If one party has been mis-
led as to what the writing contains, it would seem the writing was not
intended by him as any expression of his agreement, final or other-
wise. Furthermore, the principles of "fraud, misrepresentation, du-
ress, coercion, mistake, ... or other validating or invalidating cause,"
found in section 1-103, supplement the sales provisions of the Code
unless specifically displaced by it. The Code recognizes that fraud is
available as a defense to a sales contract.3 7 In fact, where fraud has
been practiced in a sales situation, the buyer may exercise his com-
mon law right to rescind the contract.38 In addition, section 2-721
also declares that all of the traditional remedies for damages pro.
vided by the Code are available to the buyer as well. Thus, a choice
of remedies is provided to escape an agreement tainted by fraud.80
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND GOOD FAITH
The Code permits a court to refuse to enforce a contract, or any
part of it, which is unconscionable."0 It is profitable to consider the
prohibition on unconscionable agreements together with the duty to
bargain in good faith imposed by the Code on all persons who enter
36 U.C.C. § 2-202.
37 Id. § 2-721.
38 Id.
39 See Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114 (3d
Cir. 1966).
40 U.C.C. § 2.02(1).
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into commercial transactions.4 1 The Code establishes two tests for
good faith. Nonmerchants must act honestly in a subjective sense.42
However, section 2-103(l)(b) holds a merchant to a higher and more
objective standard of good faith. A merchant has a duty to observe
the reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in his trade4 8
Fair dealing may be a higher standard of conduct than unconscion-
ability. Certainly few trade associations would admit that their con-
ception of fair dealing is measured only by standards of outright un-
conscionability. Most trades would probably assert that a great deal
more is expected from their members in order to measure up to
acceptable standards of fair dealing. Assuming a higher standard for
the particular trade, when a merchant overreaches the standard of
"fair dealing" in his trade, but has not reached the point of outright
unconscionability, a buyer could argue that the transaction should be
invalidated. However, no court has yet accepted the collective opin-
ion of a trade as a basis for establishing the reasonable commercial
standard of fair dealing to which an individual member of that trade
should be held accountable.
IV. LIMITATION OF REMEDY
Before the Code, a seller could try to avoid liability to a buyer
by limiting the remedy available to the buyer in the original sales
agreement.44 The seller may concede that he has given an express
warranty, or an implied warranty, or both of them. In fact, the seller
may also admit that the warranties which were given have been
breached. However, the seller then points to a clause in the sales
agreement which states that the buyer's remedy for the breach of
warranty is limited. For example, a liquidated damage clause in the
sales agreement may limit recovery for a breach to a fixed sum of
money insufficient to replace the buyer's actual losses. A sales agree-
41 Id. § 1-203.
42 Id. § 1-201(19) and Comment 19. This section defines good faith as honesty in
fact. See, e.g., Meadowbrook Nat'l Bank v. Markos, 3 U.C.C. Rrra. Smv. 854, 856 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966).
43 U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b).
44 See, e.g., McDonald Credit Service, Inc. v. Church, 49 Wash. 2d 400, 301 P.2
1082 (1956); W. F. Dollen & Sons v. Carl P. Miller Tractor Co., 214 Iowa 774, 241 N.%%.
307 (1932). Cf. SAL.vS Acr § 71. See generally Fritz, "Underliquidated" Damages as Limi-
tation of Liability, 33 TExAs L. REv. 196, 196-98 (1954); Note, Contractual Disclaimers
of Warranty, 23 MN. L. REV. 784, 784-85 (1939) (containing a brief history of the use
of disclaimers); Note, Limitations On Freedom To Modify Contract Remedies, 72
YAzx L.J. 723, 724-26 (disclaimers), 746-55 (liquidated damages) (1963).
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ment might provide that the seller shall not be liable at all for
money damages, but provide for some kind of substitute remedy.
For example, a substitute remedy might limit a buyer to a replace-
ment of defective parts.
The Code's basic approach to contractual remedies is the autho-
rize only fair and conscionable limitations of remedy. It contains a
series of rules which declare certain specific kinds of limitations on
remedies to be unfair and invalid.45 Beyond these specific rules, the
general doctrine of unconscionability may also invalidate grossly
unfair remedy limitations.
One of these specific rules controls liquidated damage clauses. 40
Liquidated damage clauses can work two ways. First, the buyer may
be required to pay a certain fixed sum of money if he does not per-
form the contract. The Code's approach to this problem is to codify
the pre-Code law. When such a liquidated damage clause is un-
reasonably large compared to the actual damages suffered or antici-
pated the clause may be void as a penalty.47 The second type of
liquidated damage clause limits the seller's liability to less than he
otherwise would have been responsible for under general rules of
damages. For example, a seller who sells a washing machine to a
buyer might provide that damages for breach of warranty shall not
exceed five dollars even though the loss to a buyer is a great deal
more than that. Since the limitation is entirely unreasonable in light
of the anticipated or actual harm, the Code will invalidate this clause.
If the liquidated damage clause is invalidated, the injured party may
then proceed under normal Code rules for proving damages.
The Code has another section of specific rules dealing with
substitute remedies. 48 One situation in which this section is useful
is that where the sales agreement states that the buyer's only remedy
for receiving defective goods is to have them replaced with satis-
factory goods. The Code's first rule on this kind of clause is a
technical one. If a particular substitute remedy is to be the exclusive
remedy in lieu of the usual Code remedies, section 2-719 requires
that the exclusive feature of the remedy be expressly stated in the
sales agreement. If it is not expressly stated,, the Code declares that
the substitute remedy is only optional and in no way prevents an
aggrieved party from pursuing all the other remedies normally given
45 U.C.C. §§ 2-718, 2-719.
46 Id. § 2-718.
47 Id. § 2-718(1) and Comment 1.
48 Id. § 2-719.
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to him by the Code.49 Even where the sales agreement does expressly
state that the limited remedy is an exclusive one, such term may not
be binding. If the essential purpose of the remedy should fail, the
aggrieved party can ignore it and turn to his usual Code remedies
instead.50 For example, if a seller has sold a washing machine to a
buyer and the sales agreement provides that the buyer's exclusive
remedy shall be limited to a replacement of the defective parts, this
limitation might appear to be a perfectly proper one. However, if
the washing machine is poorly engineered and as a result every time
it is used the motor burns out, this would seem to be a case where the
exclusive or limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose,
namely, the purpose of giving to the buyer a workable washing
machine. Section 2-719 would then declare that this limitation on
the remedy may be ignored and permit the buyer to turn to the
other remedies normally provided for him under the Code, such as
damages or revocation of acceptance.
Elements of fraud and misrepresentation may also remove the
mandatory nature of an express limited remedy clause. In a recent
California decision, the court dealt with seeds purchased by a tomato
grower.51 At the time of the sale, the seller knew that the tomato
seeds were defective and would not produce high quality crops as
warranted. His attempt to limit the remedy to return of purchase
price was held to be a fraud on the buyer, which the buyer could
ignore. The decision suggested that the limitation on the remedy
might be ignored and the full damages recovered.5 2 At least this
would be so if the seller knew at the time of the sale that his goods
were defective. According to the California court, if a seller knows
when he sells his goods that they are defective, it is a fraud to limit
the remedy. If this kind of rule is applicable in commercial situa-
tions, it seems that it ought to be equally applicable in consumer
situations where a buyer is placed in an inequitable situation by
limitations on remedies and the seller knew at the time of the sale
that his goods would not work properly.
There is still another rule the Code imposes on an attempt to
limit the remedies available for breach of warranty. The Code makes
any attempt to limit damages for personal injury where consumer
goods are involved prima facie unconscionable. 53 An example of how
49 Id. § 2-719()(b).
50 Id. § 2-719(2).
51 Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (196).
52 Id. at 98, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 617-19 (dictum).
53 U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
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this might work would be where a housewife buys an iron and is
severely burned because of a defect in the iron. The original sales
agreement for the iron might have stated that no damages would be
allowed by reasons of defects in the iron but instead limited the
buyer's remedy to a refund of the purchase price, or to a replace-
ment of the defective iron with a new one. However, because the
iron is consumer goods and personal injuries are involved, the Code
states that attempts by the seller to limit his buyer's remedy are
prima facie unconscionable. Unless the seller can overcome this
prima facie rule against him, the housewife may recover the full
damages for her bums, regardless of the language of the sales agree-
ment stating otherwise. This prima facie unconscionability rule
where consumer goods are involved is of great interest to personal
injury lawyers because automobiles are classified as consumer goods.
V. EXCLUSION OF WARRANTIES
The seller may try to deny the existence of all warranties by a
contract. If his goods are defective, the seller's limitation may be
struck down if it comes within the spirit of the unconscionability
doctrine which pervades all aspects of a sales transaction. It seems
rather curious that Article 2 contains so many specific rules dealing
with seller's attempts to limit the remedy for breach of warranty
but provides only the general unconscionability doctrine to deal
with a seller's attempt to completely exclude all warranties. Section
2-316 (1), however, prefers warranty-creating language over negating
or limiting language when they cannot reasonably be construed as
consistent.
VI. ExcEssivE PRICE
Another area in which unconscionability doctrine may prove
helpful is where the price is excessive even though the goods are in
no way defective. Several decisions strongly hint that excessive price
alone may make a contract unconscionable. However, these decisions
give little specific guidance to the problem of determining when, if
ever, unconscionability can occur solely because the price is excessive.
The case most often discussed is Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co.5 4 From 1957 to 1962 the appellants purchased a
number of household items from the Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company. At the time of each purchase the appellants signed a form
contract which purported to lease the additional items to them for
54 850 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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a monthly rental payment. The title to each item was to remain in
the furniture company until all the monthly payments were made.
This add-on provision had the effect of maintaining title in Walker-
Thomas until all the outstanding lease payments were made on each
purchase. Among the items was a stereo with a purchase price of
678 dollars, which was sold to appellants while they were receiving
public assistance payments. Walker-Thomas knew appellants were
receiving public assistance. On default by appellants Walker-
Thomas sought to repossess the stereo, along with almost all of the
other household furniture purchased by appellants during the 1957
to 1962 period.55
In his defense to repossession, the buyer argued "unconscion-
ability." The trial court criticised the sharp practice and irre-
sponsible business policy of selling high-priced stereo sets to welfare
recipients, but felt compelled to hold for the seller on the grounds
that the doctrine of unconscionability was not part of the common
law.56 The court of appeals reversed, holding that unconscionability
was a defense available at common law. The court remanded the
case, directing the trial court to determine whether unconscionability
actually existed under the facts of this case.5 7 The disposition on
remand was apparently not reported.
The precedent that Walker-Thomas established was that an
action based on a theory of unconscionability could be maintained
without statute. Since the subsequent adoption of the Code in the
District of Columbia there is little need for this authority. The case
did not define the elements needed for a successful action based on
unconscionability or what remedy would be available. The problem
of fashioning a remedy may be a difficult one. Would this court
permit the buyer to keep the stereo set without paying for it or give
the buyer an absolute right to return the set and recover any pay-
ments? The implications of the decision on consumer sales raises
serious policy questions. Did this court mean to suggest that sellers
are supposed to police their poor-risk customers and determine what
goods they may or may not buy? Did the court mean to imply that
welfare recipients may not purchase stereo sets, or other luxury or
semi-luxury items? s If so, would they be equally barred from buying
55 Id. at 445-447.
56 Id. at 448-449.
57 Id. at 450.
58 Cf. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-the Emperor's New Clothes, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 485, 558 (1967) arguing that the low income consumer should be dis-
couraged from purchasing luxury goods.
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a small table radio, which, perhaps, is not a necessity of life but
gives great pleasure to it? What does this kind of a decision do to the
availability of credit to these buyers? If the implications of this de-
cision are carried to their fullest, just what legitimate seller will deal
with impoverished buyers, even at a fair price, where the possibility
exists that if he does so, a court might second guess him on his de-
'cision to deal with this buyer? The Walker-Thomas case provides
little insight into the specific characteristics of unconscionability and
leaves many vague suggestions which, if carried to their ultimate,
could prove disturbing. The dissenting opinion pointed out that this
buyer apparently knew her obligations when she entered into the
sale; and, that if overseeing of welfare clients' purchases is required,
then it should come through a legislative program and not by judicial
fiat.59
A more useful case is American Home Improvement, Inc. v.
Maclver.60 That case involved a sale of siding, fourteen windows and
one door. The actual cost of installation was about 950 dollars; how-
ever, added to this cost was a sales commission of 800 dollars and
carrying charges for a sixty-month period of another 800 dollars. The
buyer signed a contract to pay about 2,500 dollars for only 950
dollars worth of goods. The New Hampshire court found this to be
unconscionable and refused to enforce the contract. 01 The persuasive
force of this case may suffer due to the rather unusual position of the
parties at the time the action was brought. The buyer had cancelled
the contract after the seller had completed a negligible amount of
work. Accordingly, a complete cancellation of the contract could be
ordered by a court without causing any undue hardship to the seller
or any unjust enrichment to the buyer. A much more difficult situa-
tion arises when the goods have been delivered to the buyer and used
by him. Since the American Home Improvement case did not deal
with this kind of fact situation, it could easily be distinguished in the
more typical situation where the contract has been executed. A
further limitation on the applicability of American Home Improve-
ment is that the contract at issue was in violation of the New Hamp-
shire truth-in-lending statute. 2 Thus, a ground for decision inde-
pendent of the unconscionability issue existed, and the court held
59 350 F2d at 450 (dissenting opinion).
60 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
61 Id. at 438-39, 201 A.2d at 888-89.
62 Id. at 437-38, 201 A.2d at 887.
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the contract unenforceable both because it violated the New
Hampshire disclosure statute and because it was unconscionable.
The case which most strongly supports the proposition that ex-
cessive price alone may make a contract unconscionable in Frostifresh
Corp. v. Reynoso.3 The facts present the more typical situation
where the contract has been executed by delivery and use of the
goods. The sale involved a refrigerator-freezer with a cash price of
900 dollars and added carrying charges of 246 dollars, making the
total purchase price 1,145 dollars. The seller admitted that the ap-
pliance had cost him 348 dollars. The buyer defaulted on his pay-
ments, but maintained possession of the appliance. The seller then
sought damages for breach of contract. The trial court held that the
transaction was unconscionable and limited the seller's recovery to
his wholesale price, instead of the normal retail price." The de-
cision was reversed as to the remedy with the statement that
while the evidence clearly warrants a finding that the contract
was unconscionable (UCC § 2-302), we are of the opinion that
plaintiff should recover its net cost for the refrigerator-freezer,
plus a reasonable 1rofit, in addition to trucking and services
charges incurred and reasonable finance charges.65
The appellate court did not specify its reasons for holding that
the facts presented a clear case of unconscionability. The evidence
showed, in addition to the excessive price, that the buyers were
Spanish-speaking persons who could not understand English. 6 As
such, they had no way of reading or understanding the sales contract
which was written in English, and the seller made an effort to avoid
translating or explaining the document to them.
Another case which purports to hold a contract unenforceable
because the purchase price was excessive is In re State of New York
ex rel Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc. 67 ITM Inc. had devised an elaborate
sales routine which involved alleged misrepresentations and fraudu-
lent sales practices. The "buyers" were induced to sign the retail in-
stallment payment contracts by a plan through which the purchaser
was to be paid for referring prospective customers to ITM. The
trial court held that the contracts were unconscionable and therefore
63 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rcu'd as to remedy 54 Misc. 2d
119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Div.; 1967).
64 Id. at 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
65 54 Misc. 2d 119, 120, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (App. Div. 1967).
66 52 Misc. 2d 26, 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (DISt. Ct. 1966).
67 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d S0W"(Sup. Ct. Trial Term 1966).
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
unenforceable. However, the court also found that ITM, Inc. was
guilty of fraudulent practices, that the scheme was an illegal lottery,
and that the contracts were unenforceable because ITM, Inc. was
an unlicensed foreign corporation. 8 ITM is another example of a
court using unconscionability language in conjunction with other
elements of unfairness, or alternative grounds of decision. The court
held that even if the prices were not unconscionable per se, they
were excessive in the context of the case.60
From these cases dealing with the unconscionability doctrine as
applied to excessive price, it seems fairly clear that excessive price
coupled with other factors, such as a purely executory contract or a
foreign-speaking purchaser who did not understand the contract, has
served as a basis for finding unconscionability. Whether excessive
price alone is enough has not yet been established. Of course, minor
discrepancies between actual price and true value will probably never
be enough to bring about a finding of unconscionability. More likely,
something approaching a "shocking" discrepancy will be required.
German law uses a price-value differential of one-half as a measure
of unconscionability" and most American cases seem to require at
least that much of a disparity.71
At present price-value disparity alone is probably not enough
to establish unconscionability of a sales contract. The Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code suggests the court should consider the circum-
stances giving rise to the price-value disparity.72 While this Code has
not yet been promulgated by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, and probably will not be for the
next year or so,* it may provide some insight as to where future legis-
lation on this problem may be headed. Briefly, where excessive price
is involved, the test for unconscionability adopted by the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code looks for a "gross disparity" between the
price paid and the price readily obtainable by buyers of similar
credit in a credit transaction in the same area. In other words, the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code does not look at the price-value dis-
parity alone; it also looks at the buyer involved. 7 Apparently, it
68 Id. at 62, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 329-30.
69 Id. at 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
70 78 HAxv. L. Rav. 895, 898 (1965).
71 See Skilton and Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MicH. L. Rav. 1465, 1475 (1967).
72 UNIFOM CONSUMER Camrr CODE § 6.111 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1967).
13 Id. § 6.111(3)(c).
* Prof. Shanker's remarks were made in 1967. The UXC was recently promulgated.
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would recognize that the credit worthiness of some buyers is so
much less than the credit worthiness of other buyers that higher
prices can lawfully be charged to take care of the seller's higher
risk. It is only when the higher price presents gross disparity from
what a particular buyer could normally have obtained elsewhere
that unconscionability might result.
The test found in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is similar
to that used recently by a Pennsylvania federal district court in In re
Elkins-Dell.74 Unconscionability, Judge Lord pointed out in his
opinion, is not proven merely by a showing that the terms are oner-
ous, oppressive, or one-sided. Instead, it must be shown that the terms
bear no reasonable relationship to the business risks involved in the
transaction. Judge Lord implied the ability of the debtor to obtain
more favorable credit terms elsewhere was relevant to the issue of
unconscionability.75
The Elkins-Dell case arose from an involuntary bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Prior to the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings Fidel-
ity American Financial Corporation executed a loan to Elkins-Dell
taking an assignment of accounts receivable. When the question of
enforceability was presented to the court, twenty-four thousand
dollars in accounts receivable would have been included in the
bankrupt's estate if the contract were held to be unconscionable.
The referee so found, but the district court remanded the case for
further findings of fact.7 6
The ultimate question for the referee will be whether these con-
tracts were, in the light of all the circumstances, reasonable com-
mercial devices. Among the issues which may be explored...
are the financial positions of the bankrupts at the time the
agreements were entered into; the extent to which agreements
of this kind are customary among lenders like Fidelity; the
extent to which Fidelity's contracts vary with and reflect antid-
pated risks; the availability of other credit to the bankrupts, both
at the time and after they entered into these agreements; the
extent to which the various provisions were enforced by Fidelity
or influenced the bankrupt's business conduct, particularly their
ability to secure other funds; whether the terms of these con-
tracts facilitated commerce by making funds available where
they otherwise would not be or impeded commerce by preclud-
ing access to other sources of funds.... 7
74 In re Matter of Elkins-Ddll Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 875.
77 Id. at 874.
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The court also held that the referee should consider the impact of
his decision or future financing in similar situations.78
Elkins-Dell gives approval to the notion that unconscionability
where price and credit are involved cannot be based on price alone
but must also take into consideration the capacity of a particular
buyer to get better credit elsewhere. This may be a severe limitation
on the usefulness of the unconscionability doctrine to those persons
who are so impoverished that they often suffer the most unfair con-
tracts, because many of these buyers could not have gotten credit
elsewhere, or at least not on any better terms.
SUMMARY
In this article the authors have tried to explore consumer protec-
tion devices found in the U.G.G. and the special problems they
create. Although many of the consumer remedies discussed have not
yet been clearly defined, or in some cases even recognized, by the
courts, they are available to the lawyer who may represent the con-
sumer. The discussion does not purport to be complete, but an out-
line of the path in which the law may develop toward greater pro-
tection of the consumer. The large number of recent cases in the
area indicates that the development of the law, within the general
framework created by the U.C.G., has just begun.
78 Id. at 875.
